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We propose a new quantum secret sharing scheme using a single non-entangled qubit. In the
scheme, by transmitting a qubit to the next party sequentially, a sender can securely transmit a
secret message to N receivers who could only decode the message cooperatively after randomly
shuffling the polarization of the qubit. We explain this quantum secret sharing scheme into the one
between a sender and two receivers, and generalize the scheme between a sender and N receivers.
Since our scheme is capable of using a faint coherent pulse as a qubit, it is experimentally feasible
within current technology.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
A cryptography based on quantum mechanics has received much attention since the seminal work on quantum key
distribution (QKD) by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) [1] and Ekert (E91) [2]. In this scheme, information can be
securely transmitted to a privileged person in novel ways [3, 4]. In distinction to this type of one-to-one communication,
recently, another quantum cryptography scheme, named quantum secret sharing (QSS), was proposed by Hillery,
Buzˇek, and Berthiaume (HBB99) [5]. Through this scheme a common key or a secret message can be securely
distributed to many parties simultaneously, who are not entirely trusted. Then, while no one alone can recover the
message, the receivers can cooperatively recover the message by combining the whole distributed information of the
sender. Since this cryptography scheme of QSS can be used effectively when a sender wants to transmit a message
to many untrusted parties simultaneously, a lot of works have succeeded theoretically [6, 7, 8, 9] and experimentally
[10] as one of the most important applications of quantum cryptography.
Most of the proposed QSS protocols use an entangled state [5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12]. Yet, the use of the entangled state
is not easy for multiparty secret sharing, since the efficiency of preparing many-partite entangled state is not high
enough for real application [13, 14]. In addition, the communication efficiency of the proposed QSS protocols has
reached in maxmum 50% in principle [15].
Meanwhile, two QSS protocols without entanglement were proposed, which were modifications of BB84 [15]. One
protocol is that a sender creates a two-qubit product state in the base Z = {|0〉, |1〉} or X = {|+〉, |−〉} and sends
each qubit to the receivers, respectively. Then each receiver measures his own received qubit and decodes the key
bit by coworking with the other receivers. In this protocol, the theoretical communication efficiency has doubled in
comparison with the scheme using an entangled state. Another protocol is that a sender sends a string of qubits to
receivers, in which key bits are encoded. Each receiver shuffles the polarization of the string of qubits with his own
parameters and sends the string to the next receiver sequentially. Then, the last receiver measures the polarization
of the string and decodes the information from the sender by combining the receivers’ shuffling parameters. More
recently, a single qubit QSS was proposed experimentally [16]. However, the problem with these protocols is that
they are insecure against photon number splitting (PNS) attack [17] except the case of the use of a single photon as
a qubit. Moreover, even though the protocols may use a single photon, it is not easy to make a reliable single-photon
source with current technology and photons may be easily lost due to the imperfect channel efficiency. To overcome
this vulnerability of QSS protocols without entanglement, in this paper, we propose a new secure QSS protocol, which
is without entanglement, and can use a single not-so weak coherent laser pulse as a qubit.
II. PROTOCOL
As is shown in the schematic diagram in Fig. 1, our protocol uses a randomly polarized qubit. Here the sender Alice
sends a single randomly polarized not-so-weak pulse to the receiver Rec-1. On receiving the qubit, Rec-1 prepares two
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FIG. 1: Schematic diagram of QSS protocol with a single qubit. PS is the photon source, PR the polarization rotator, BS the
beam splitter and PBS the polarizing beam splitter.
rotational angles, an arbitrary random angle φ1 to hide the qubit polarization and the other one s1 ∈ {0, pi/2,±pi/4}
to shuffle the qubit state, and rotates the polarization of the received qubit. Then he sends the qubit to Rec-2. Rec-2
puts the received qubit in the same process, but with different random angles, φ2 to hide the qubit polarization and
s2 ∈ {0, pi/2,±pi/4} to shuffle the qubit state, and returns the qubit to Alice. Alice compensates her random angle,
codes a key bit, and randomly shuffles the polarization basis. Then she sends the qubit to Rec-2. Rec-2 compensates
his arbitrary random angle φ2 and sends the qubit to Rec-1. Rec-1 also compensates his random angle φ1 and measures
the photon state. When Alice publicly announces the basis of the qubit, Rec-1 and Rec-2 cooperatively decode and
share the key bit. For integrity, after error correction and privacy amplification, Alice, Rec-1, and Rec-2 check the
shared key bit with a hash function. In this QSS protocol each receiver generates his own hidden information so
that the information given by the sender can be decoded only when the two receivers’ and the sender’s information
is joined.
Protocol.- The procedure of the proposed QSS is as follows:
(p.1) The sender, Alice, prepares a linearly polarized qubit whose initial state is |0〉 and prepares an arbitrary random
angle θ. Then Alice rotates the polarization of the qubit by the prepared angle θ, to bring the state |ψ0〉 =
Uˆy(θ)|0〉 = |θ〉, where Uˆy(θ) = cos θ1 − i sin θσˆy rotating the polarization angle along the y-axis. σˆy is the
Pauli-y operator. Alice sends the qubit of |ψ0〉 to Rec-1.
(p.2) Rec-1 chooses another random angles φ1 and s1, and rotates the polarizations of the received qubit by φ1 + s1.
Then the qubit state is |ψ1〉 = |θ + φ1 + s1〉. Rec-1 sends the qubit to Rec-2.
(p.3) On receiving the qubit, Rec-2 also chooses other random angles φ2 and s2, and rotates the polarization of the
received qubit by φ2+ s2. Then the qubit state becomes |ψ2〉 = |θ+
∑2
i=1[φi+ si]〉. Then Rec-2 sends the qubit
to Alice.
(p.4) Alice rotates the polarization of the received qubit by k1 ∈ {0, pi/2} or k2 ∈ {±pi/4} to encode the key bit,
and compensates her random angle by applying −θ. Here, if Alice wants to encode ’0’ (’1’) to the qubit, she
rotates the polarization of qubit by {0, pi/4} ({pi/2,−pi/4}). The state becomes |ψ3〉 = |kj +
∑2
i=1[φi + si]〉,
where j ∈ {1, 2}. Then Alice transmits the encoded qubit to Rec-2.
(p.5) After receiving the qubit, Rec-2 compensates his random angle by rotating the polarization of the received qubit
by −φ2, and sends the qubit to Rec-1.
(p.6) Rec-1 compensates his random angle by rotating the polarization by −φ1, divides the received qubit into two
qubits, and measures the polarization of each qubit, one on the rectilinear basis, {|0〉, |pi/2〉}, and the other on
the diagonal basis, {| + pi/4〉, | − pi/4〉}. The reason of the division here is because Rec-1 does not know the
polarization basis on this stage. The basis of the qubit is determined by kj +
∑2
i=1 si. We can find the basis
from Table 1. So after measurement, Rec-1 stores the results of each measurement until he knows the whole
values of kj +
∑2
i=1 si ≡ l. Therefore, Rec-1’s ultimate decision angle is l − s1 and Rec-2’s is s2.
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Rec-2
Rec-1
0 pi/2 pi/4 −pi/4
0 0 pi/2 −pi/4 pi/4
pi/2 pi/2 0 pi/4 −pi/4
pi/4 pi/4 −pi/4 0 pi/2
−pi/4 −pi/4 pi/4 pi/2 0
TABLE I: Polarization angles from Alice’s encoding depending on Rec-1’s and Rec-2’s ultimate decision angles. Rec-1 and
Rec-2 have a key from mutual relations among their own values.
(p.7) Here, to make M bits of the key string, the three authorized persons repeat the above protocol N(≥M) times.
Rec-1 can lose the key bit for one part of division of some qubits, because of the division of the qubit. In other
word, one part of the division may happen to have a vacuum state. If sifted key is shorter than required, the
parties need only follow the same procedure from the start until the sifted key string is of satisfactory length
(M bits). Rec-1 discards N −M qubits which make vacuum states. As a result, Rec-1 gets M bits of the key
string.
(p.8) Alice publicly announces her M basis shuffling factors j. However, Rec-1 and Rec-2 still do not know in which
basis to look yet, because they know nothing about the action of the other. Therefore, the receivers get together
and compare their polarization angles to recover the key angle string from Alice. Then they can find the basis
and key angle as shown in Table 1.
(p.9) Alice hasM bits of k, while each of Rec-1 and Rec-2 hasM bits of their decision angles, l−s1 and s2, respectively.
Rec-1 and Rec-2 cooperatively recover the M bits of the key value k with their own decision angles l − s1 and
s2. In this process Rec-1 and Rec-2 individually exchange their angles l − s1 and s2. Then the receivers have
the key angles of k1 for Rec-1 and k2 for Rec-2.
(p.10) (Error correction and privacy amplification) After recovering the key angles, they proceed error correction and
privacy amplification using same method with BB84 protocol. Alice and receivers can convert the polarization
of key bits into raw key bits regarding a 0 or +pi/4 as denoting a ′0′ and a pi/2 or −pi/4 as a ′1′.
(p.11) (Check of integrity) Rec-1 and Rec-2 publicly announce the hash values of the recovered key bit h1 = H(k1)
and h2 = H(k2) to Alice, respectively, where H is the hash function. Then Alice announces her hash value of
h0 = H(k) to Rec-1 and Rec-2, individually. They compare the received hash value with their own. When the
hash values are the same, they share the key bits, otherwise all parties abolish the key bits and they repeat the
protocol again.
Through this protocol, three parties can share key string through quantum channels. Note that, by slightly modi-
fying the procedure of from (p.6) to (p.8) in the protocol, we can increase the communication efficiency.
III. SECURITY
Honesty — As for secret sharing, if one of the receivers is dishonest, the dishonest one could get the true information,
while the others might have wrong one. However, in this protocol, let us assume that Rec-1 knows the true key bits
from Rec-2’s announcement of his decision factor s2. If Rec-1 gives wrong information of l or s1 to Rec-2, Rec-2 has
wrong information so that h1 6= h2. Moreover, when Alice compares her hash value with the received ones from Rec-1
and Rec-2, the hash values become h1 = h0 while h2 6= h0. Hence Alice knows who is dishonest.
Security — In QSS, there are various attack strategies depending on the protocol [3]. Since the PNS and the
impersonation attacks are considered to be the most efficient ones from an eavesdropper’s prospective, we examine
the security of our protocol against those attacks. For ease of discussion, we consider that Eve, the eavesdropper, is
so superior that her action is limited only by the laws of physics. We examine the security when a key is encoded into
a coherent-state pulse, |α〉 = |√µeiθ〉, with the mean number of photons µ. And the transmission on a line of length
l [km] is T = 10−δ/10, where δ = αl with the losses α [dB/km] on the line [18].
PNS attack — The conventional strategy of the PNS attack for weak coherent laser pulses is that Eve splits off
a qubit from each pulse and keeps it in the quantum storage. When the basis reconciliation is made between Alice
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FIG. 2: Impersonation attack; Eve impersonates Alice and two receivers, Rec-1 and Rec-2.
and all the receivers via a classical channel, Eve gets the secret information by measuring the state of the stored
qubit during the bases are announced. In this scheme, Eve can measure the number of photons with quantum non-
demolition method [19]. When more than two photons are transmitted, she splits off one photon and stores it. After
the reconciliation procedure between Alice and the receivers Eve measures the photon polarization. In our protocol,
however, all qubits in any step have a completely random polarization. Even if Eve splits off some photons from a
qubit in the channel between Alice and the receivers, she should determine two continuous angles θ and φi. Moreover,
since Eve does not know the polarization basis, she should just estimate the polarization angle with some probability
of error. If, for simplicity’s sake, we assume that each channel has a same distance, Eve’s mean number of photons
of each channel from PNS is µT c−1(1 − T ), where c ∈ {1, 3, 4} means c-th channel of PNS. Then she might try to
estimate the polarization with the photons. The optimum estimation of the random polarizations in this case can
be obtained from the fidelity which is calculated to consider the amount of information. Depending on the initial
amplitude and the transmission rate, we find the maximum bound for Eve’s information by fidelity as well presented
in [20]. In this paper, for the realistic transmission T = 0.5 and its amplitude |√µeiθ| = 2.83 give fidelity FE = 0.83.
Another possible PNS attack is that Eve counts the number of photons at the output of Alice’s box. If she finds
more than one, she keeps one photon and forwards the others. Eve waits until photons come back from Rec-2. Eve
attaches her unpertubed photon to the others, and sends these photons to Alice. After the process (p.4), when Alice
sends the encoded qubit, Eve intercepts the qubit and pick up her photon. At this time, Since Eve knows where she
attached the photon, she can easily picks up it. Then the polarization of Eve’s photon is exactly the one chosen by
Alice to code her key bit, because the photon has not been perturbed by the receivers. Eve keeps the photon and
sends the others to the receivers. Here, one of the possible ways to pick up the same photon is to send her photon in
just before or just after the others with a very fast switch when photons are transmitted from Rec-2 to Alice. When
the shuffling factors are announced Eve recovers the key bits. This type of attack can be prevented easily, when Alice
uses a beam splitter. Alice divides her photons into two using a beam splitter in the process (p.4) and sends one part
of the split photons. Since Eve does not know whether her photon is lost or not by the beam splitter, Eve gets wrong
key bits depending. This counter-attack method does not degrade the communication efficiency, because our protocol
uses a not-so-weak coherent pulse.
The second way is that Eve slightly modifies the wavelength of her photon through a non-linear process which does
not change the polarization. In this case Eve also loses her photon because of the beam splitter. If the key length is
long, Eve can not attack the key bit. For example, when the key length is 256 bits and the beam splitter is a 50:50
one, Eve should use a brute text attack for the unknown 128 bit. This is in no ways different from the brute text
attack to a key of 128 bit length, which is a usual key length in modern cryptosystem. Another counter-attack method
is also well explain in Ref.[21]. According to this method, Alice and the receivers can filter out unwanted frequencies
by using an optical device, which is the combination of an optical grating and a very small frequency bandwidth filter
like a high resolution Fabry-Perot interferometer. In any case, the most simple and efficient way to prevent an attack
is to use a beam splitter. Hence, the conventional PNS attacks are not valid in our protocol as described above even
though we can use a not-so-weak coherent pulse to make quantum secret sharing.
Impersonation attack — Even if we use a not-so-weak coherent pulse instead of a single-photon to make key bits,
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FIG. 3: Rec-1’s error rate Perror depending on Eve’s optimal probability for discriminating between the four states under the
number of n photons µT ; when Rec-1 knows mean photon number, he gets error rate to check the existence of Eve.
our protocol is secure against the impersonation attack [20], in which Eve impersonates Alice to Rec-1 and Rec-2 and
vice versa. The strategy of the attack is shown in Fig.2. Eve intercepts the transmitting qubit from Alice to Rec-1,
and sends a different pulse which is prepared by herself. When Eve’s qubit is returned from Rec-2, Eve intercepts the
qubit and stores it. Eve rotates Alice’s qubit and sends it to Alice. When Alice sends her qubit to Rec-2 after encoding
a key, Eve intercepts Alice’s qubit and measures it after compensating her random angle. After the measurement, Eve
encodes the key angle, which she has measured, to the stored qubit and sends it to Rec-2. On this condition, as far as
Alice does not shuffle the polarization basis, Eve can measure the angle without any difficulty. Because of Alice’s basis
shuffling, however, Eve can not encode the key angle perfectly. Let us calculate the error rate of Rec-1’s measurement.
As far as polarization is concerned, Eve has an exact copy of Alice’s key. Therefore, Eve can obtain full information
using strategies based on unambiguous state discrimination. Unambiguous discrimination among four states of a
two-dimensional Hilbert space is only possible when at least three copies of the state are available. And the optimal
probability for discriminating between the four states with n ≥ 3 copies is found to be pok(n) = 1 − (1/2)[(n−1)/2],
where [·] is the rounding to the closest lower integer [18]. The probability of there being n-photons in the coherent
state with mean photon number µT , which is reduced from µ, is pc(n, µT ) = e
−µT (µT )n/n!. Then the maximal
probability that Eve can discriminate the state without error is
PE =
∑
n≥3
pok(n)pc(n, µT )
=
∑
n≥3
e−µT (µT )n
n!
{
1−
(
1
2
)[n−1
2
]
}
. (1)
Therefore, the error rate of Rec-1’s side is
Perror =
1
2
(1− PE) (2)
since Eve’s wrong encoding makes 1/2 error rate on Rec-1’s side. The error rate depending on the mean photon
number is plotted in Fig. 3. If the error rate from his measurement is similar to Perror, he can ascertain whether Eve
exists or not. The figure shows that for T = 0.5 and µ ≃ 6 the error rate is Perror = 0.3. In other words, when Alice
sends a coherent state pulse with µ = 6, the criterion to check eavesdropper is Perror = 0.3.
6IV. GENERAL PROTOCOL
In QSS, a sender usually shares a message with more than two receivers simultaneously. In our protocol, since
we can use a single not-so-weak coherent pulse, it is easy to generalize the QSS protocol for the case of (N + 1)
multi-parties (N ≥ 2); one is a sender Alice and the others receivers.
General protocol.—The general protocol among (N + 1) parties is as follows:
(F.0) Alice prepares a randomly polarized qubit |ψ0〉 = |θ〉 and sends it to Rec-1.
(F.1) Rec-1 chooses his random angle φ1 and rotates the polarizations of the received qubit by φ1 + s1, where
s1 ∈ {0,±pi/4, pi/2}. Rec-1 sends the qubit to Rec-2.
(F.n) In this way, Rec-n (n ∈ {2, ...N − 1}) receives the qubit and repeats the same polarization procedure as his
precedent. Then he sends it to Rec-(n+ 1).
(F.N) The state of the last receiver Rec-N becomes |ψN 〉 = |θ +
∑N
i=1[φ
i + si]〉. Then, Rec-N sends it to Alice.
(F.N+1) After receiving the qubit, Alice compensates her private angle with −θ and encodes her key angle, k. Then the
state becomes |k +∑Ni=1[φi + si]〉. Alice sends it back to N th party.
(B.N) Rec-N receives the qubit from Alice and rotates the polarization angle with −φN . The state becomes |k +∑N−1
i=1 [φ
i] +
∑N
i=1[si]〉. Then he transmits the qubit to Rec-(N − 1).
(B.n) In this way, Rec-n receives the qubit from Rec-(n+1). After rotating the polarization with Rec-n’ angle. Then
the state becomes |k +∑n−1i=1 [φi] +∑Ni=1[si]〉.
(B.1) Then, Rec-1’s qubit state after compensating his random angle becomes|k +∑Ni=1[si]〉. Rec-1 measures the
polarization in the same way with (p.6).
(B.0) Since each party has his own decision angles si, they recover the key bits cooperatively. Then they can share
the key from Alice. By repeating this procedure similar to the protocol between three parties, all receivers get
the M bits of key string.
Similar to the N = 2 case, Alice and all the receivers check the shared key bit with hash functions for the
integrity. After receiving the key bits, all receivers publicly announce their hash values of the recovered key to Alice
independently. Alice announces her hash value to all receivers, simultaneously. Then they compare the received hash
value with their own H(k) = H(kn) where k is Alice’s key bit and kn is the n
th receiver’s key bit. When all hash
values are the same, they share the key bit, otherwise the key values are abolished and they repeat the protocol again.
V. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
Our QSS protocol has several advantages in comparison with the other QSS schemes:
(1) Even though our protocol uses not-so-weak coherent pulses, the random polarization and the basis shuffling
can effectively block up the PNS and the impersonation attacks, while the other QSS protocols without entanglement
are vulnerable when they use not-so-weak coherent pulses. So our QSS protocol is easier to realize experimentally
with modern technology than the other QSS protocols. We have modified the BB84 protocol to achieve stronger QSS
protocol. Similarly, we can also make the QKD protocol stronger than BB84 for the above reasons.
(2) In the step of (p.6), Rec-1 splits the received qubit into two parts to measure the polarization with two different
bases. To split the qubit, Rec-1 should get coherent-state pulse with mean photon number at least 2. As shown in
Fig. 3, we can use multi-photon pulse and control the mean photon number by referring the relation between Perror
and mean photon number. Therefore, comparing with the other QSS protocols without entanglement, we do not need
to employ quantum memory to store the qubit even if we use non-orthogonal bases.
(3) In this protocol, if one of the receivers, Rec-i, is dishonest and sends wrong decision factor to the other receivers,
each of the honest receivers generates a different hash value. Alice and honest receivers can easily notice that Rec-i
is dishonest by checking the integrity with hash values. Therefore, we can discern dishonest behavior among the
receivers.
(4) Even though our protocol uses a classical channel to distribute the information of the measurement basis from
Alice, neither Eve nor any receiver can obtain the information from Alice, because all receivers shuffle the polarization
bases. In other words, the measurement basis of each receiver depends on the shuffling of the other receivers. This
7is another reason why our protocol is robust against the PNS attack. Consequently, compared with other protocols,
communication through the classical channel of our protocol reveals no information to Eve or any dishonest receivers.
In summary, we have proposed a new protocol of quantum secret sharing with a single not-so weak coherent pulse
for multipartite receivers. In this protocol, because each receiver shuffles the polarization bases, no one alone can
obtain the secret key transmitted by a sender, while all receivers can recover the key cooperatively. A dishonest
receiver can be noticed by exchanging the hash values of the recovered key between communicators. Finally, since
all of the operations are random and independent, the security is guaranteed against the PNS and the impersonation
attacks.
Acknowledgements
This work is supported by Creative Research Initiatives of the Korea Ministry of Science and Technology. Y.J. Choi
and Y.-J. Park are supported by the SRC Program of the Korea Science and Engineering Foundation (R11-2005-021).
J. Kim was financially supported by Korea Ministry of Information and Communication under the ”Next Generation
Security” project.
[1] Bennett C H and Brassard G 1984 Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing (Bangalore) (New
York:IEEE) p 175
[2] Ekert A K 1991 Phys. Rev. Lett. 67 661
[3] For a review, see Gisin N, Ribordy G, Tittel W, and Zbinden H 2002 Rev. Mod. Phys. 74 145
[4] Curty M, Lewenstein M, and Lutkenhaus N 2004 Phys. Rev. Lett. 92 217903
[5] Hillery M, Buzˇek V and Berthiaume A 1999 Phys. Rev. A 59 1829
[6] Karlsson A, Koashi M and Imoto N 1999 Phys. Rev. A 59 162
[7] Cleve R, Gottesman D and Lo H-K 1999 Phys. Rev. Lett. 83 648
[8] Karimipour V, Bahraminasab A and Bagherinezhad S 2002 Phys. Rev. A 65 042320
[9] Zhang Z J, Li Y and Man Z X 2005 Phys. Rev. A 71 044301
[10] Tittel W, Zbinden H and Gisin N 2001 Phys. Rev. A 63 042301
[11] Lance A M, Symul T, Bowen W P, Tyc T, Sanders B C and Lam P K 2003 New J. Phys. 5 4
[12] Li X H, Zhou P, Li C-Y, Zhou H-Y and Deng F-G 2006 J. Phys. B: At. Mol. Opt. 39 1975
[13] Bouwmeester D, Pan J W, Daniell M, Weinfurter H and Zeilinger A 1999 Phys. Rev. Lett. 82 1345
[14] Pan W, Daniell M, Gasparoni S, Weihs G and Zeilinger A 2001 Phys. Rev. Lett. 86 4435
[15] Guo G P and Guo G C 2003 Phys. Lett. A 310 247 ; Yan F-L and Gao T 2005 Phys. Rev. A 72 012304
[16] Schmid C, Trojek P, Bourennane M, Kurtsiefer C, Zukowski M and Weinfurter H 2005 Phys. Rev. Lett. 95 230505
[17] Niederberger A, Scarani V and Gisin N 2005 Phys. Rev. A 71 042316
[18] Ac´ın A, Gisin N and Scarani V 2004 Phys. Rev. A 69 012309
[19] Naik D S et al. 2000 Phys. Rev. Lett. 84 4733 ; Pryde G J, O’Brien J L, White A G, Bartlett S D and Ralph T C 2004
Phys. Rev. Lett. 92 190402
[20] Kye W-H, Kim C-M, Kim M S and Park Y-J 2005 Phys. Rev. Lett. 95 040501
[21] Kye W-H and Kim M S quant-ph/0508028
